Chicago Journal of International Law
Volume 11

Number 1

Article 9

6-1-2010

Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in
Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks
Eric J. Pan

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Pan, Eric J. (2010) "Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial
Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks," Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 11: No. 1,
Article 9.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol11/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional
Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond
Transgovernmental Networks
Eric J. Pan*
Table of Contents
244
I. Introduction...............................................
............. 247
...................
II. International Financial Architecture
249
A . International O rganizations ............................................................................
252
...............................
B. State-to-State Contact Groups
254
...................................
Networks
C. Transgovernmental
258
.............................
D. Bilateral and Regional Networks
262
........................................
E. Private Standards Setting Bodies
F. International Financial Architecture as Work-in-Progress..........................263
264
.................................
III. The Problem of Supervision
..... 264
A. Supervision as a Distinctive Form of Regulation ............
B. The Struggle to Supervise Cross-Border Financial Institutions.................269
IV. An International Administrative Law Model for Cross-Border Supervision
.................................................
273
............. 273
A. An International Administrative Law Agency..........
B. Case Study: European System of Financial Supervisors ................... 277
C. Accountability and Legitimacy of an International Administrative Law
281
...........................................
Body ........
283
V. Conclusion................................................

Associate Professor of Law and Director, The Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on Corporate
Governance, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New York, NY. E-mail: epan@yu.edu. The
author wishes to thank Kevin Browning, Val Myteberi, Arielle Katzman, Brian Lederman and
Eddie Hynes for invaluable research assistance.

243

Chicago Journalof InternationalLaw

I. INTRODUCTION
The limited role international organizations and networks played in
preventing and responding to the global financial crisis is a case of expectations
falling short of reality. As David Zaring has noted in this journal, the
"international financial architecture," which consists of the universe of
specialized international organizations, economic treaties and regulatory
networks pertaining to financial regulation, was mostly ineffective or at best
marginally useful in helping to manage the financial crisis.' Instead, the
international response to the crisis relied on state-to-state negotiations by
political leaders, most notably through the G20.2 The fact that it took
agreements at the ministerial and heads-of-government level to coordinate a
response to the crisis is a rebuke to those who argue that transgovernmental
networks' and soft law instruments can sustain a robust framework for
regulatory cooperation among states.4
At the same time, dependence on high politics' and state-centric forums
like the G20 to prevent and manage future financial crises is deeply unsatisfying
from both the financial law and international law perspectives. While the G20
was effective in spurring joint action by states,' there are reasons to be skeptical
I
2

See David Zaring, International Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 Chi J Intl L 475 (2010).
See id at 495-501. The G20 is a forum focused on international economic development
composed of the finance ministers, central bank governors and heads of government of nineteen
countries and the EU. The nineteen countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
South Korea, Turkey, UK and US.

3

See text accompanying notes 40-66.

4

See, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton 2004); David Zaring,
Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 Chi J Intl L 547 (2005);
Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law,
115 Yale L J 1490 (2006). See also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va J Intl L 1 (2002)
(arguing that transgovernmental networks must work in concert with international organizations).

5

"High politics" typically refers to those issues that tend to be of great national interest, particularly
issues related to national and economic security. As states are less willing to compromise on these
issues, international cooperation is more difficult to achieve without serious political bargaining by
high state officials. See, for example, Pierre-Hugues Verdier, TransnationalRegulatoy Networks and
Their limits, 34 Yale J Intl L 113, 122-23 (2009). Areas of "low politics," such as banking,
securities law, and antitrust tend to be less encumbered. See Kal Raustiala, TransnationalNetworks.
Past andPresent, 43 Intl Law 205, 208 (2009).
See, for example, The London Summit, London Communiqui of the Leaders of the G20 ("G20 London

6

Communique') (Apr 2, 2009), online at http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summitaims/summit-communique/ (visited Mar 22, 2010); The Pittsburgh Summit 2009, G20 Leaders'
Statement
("G20
Pittsburgh
Statement")
(Sept
24-25,
2009),
online
at
http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010).
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that the G20 will retain its high level of activity once the immediate threat of the
crisis dissipates and international cooperation in the area of financial regulation
loses its political urgency. Likewise, it is unclear whether the G20 will regain its
vigor and effectiveness if a future crisis develops. For financial law scholars, the
G20, both in its existence and in the types of actions it puts forward, represents
only a temporary solution to an on-going problem of regulation of international
financial markets and institutions. A regulatory vacuum remains to be filled. For
international law scholars, the G20 offers little advancement of international
legal norms in promoting cooperation among states and their regulatory
agencies. Having witnessed its shortcomings, we should consider ways to bolster
the international financial architecture to fill this regulatory vacuum and to
strengthen the international legal framework for regulatory cooperation.
The path forward depends first on recognizing two problems with how
legal scholars viewed the international financial architecture before the crisis.
International law scholars frequently noted that the international financial
architecture relied to a great extent on informal transgovernmental networks as
opposed to formal international organizations or other treaty-based
mechanisms.' Thus, the international financial architecture appeared to provide
convincing empirical support for such scholars' claims about the effectiveness of
transgovernmental networks in promoting regulatory cooperation among states.9
7

Divergent positions on remedial measures inevitably impair cooperative efforts between the
political leaders who comprise the G20. For example, last Fall's summit in Pittsburgh produced
an unequivocal resolve that more rigorous oversight was necessary to curb future crises.
However, political pressures limited any ability to agree upon a proper solution. While the US
fought for very high capital requirements, particularly on large institutions posing systemic risks,
European leaders balked, seeing the US plan as disproportionately favorable to US financial
institutions, which are generally less intimately intertwined with the local economy than European
banks. See Damian Paletta and Alessandra Galloni, Europe, US Spar on Curefor Banks, Wall St J Al
(Sept 23, 2009). See also Anna Fifleld, G7 Warms To Idea of Bank Ley, Fin Times online (Feb 6,
2010),
online
at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f64999e2-134a-11ldf-9f5f00144feab49a,dwp-uuid= 729ab242-9cbl-11db-8ec6-0000779e2340.htmI (visited May 3, 2010)
(describing breakdown in regulatory coordination among the G7 states after the 2009 G20
meetings).

8

See, for example, Zaring, 5 Chi J Intl L at 554-92 (cited in note 4) (discussing the achievements of
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and International Organization of Securities
Commission); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in
Michael Byers, ed, The Role of Law in InternaionalPolitics 177 (Oxford 2000); Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl
L at 28-35 (cited in note 4) (discussing the rise of transgovernmental networks in international
securities regulation).

9

But see Stavros Gadinis, The Potics of Competon in InternatonalFinancialRegulation, 49 Harv Intl L
(2008) (arguing that successful cases of international coordination in the realm of financial
regulation can be best explained by domestic interest group preferences and states' relative
position in a particular market for financial services); Verdier, 34 Yale J Intl L 113 (cited in note 5)
(expressing skepticism that the accomplishments of transgovernmental networks has more to do
with a convergence of interests than the effectiveness of the networks themselves).
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In fact, the international financial architecture proved incapable of preventing or
managing the causes and effects of the recent financial crisis. The reason why is
the second problem. Financial law scholars (and, for that matter, regulators and
policymakers) did not speak out more strongly before the crisis about the
limitations of the international financial architecture. Specifically, financial law
scholars focused their attention on the coordination and harmonization of rules
and standards in areas of accounting, securities, and capital adequacy, but left
unresolved the problems of prudential supervision of cross-border financial
institutions and systemic risk regulation.10 The failure of states to provide for an
international legal regime capable of conducting prudential supervision of crossborder financial institutions proved to be one of the reasons why the
international financial architecture was unable to prevent financial instability in
the US from becoming a global financial crisis.
In response to the recent financial crisis, national regulators and financial
law scholars now agree on the greater importance of prudential supervision and
systemic risk regulation." Regulatory reform efforts proposed in the US, EU and
other major jurisdictions emphasize more intensive oversight of financial
institutions by regulatory supervisors, requiring real-time access to information,
better knowledge of financial institutions' activities throughout the world, and
broader exercise of discretion by such supervisors. 2
What is required is an international legal framework that can provide such
intensive supervision of cross-border financial institutions and macroeconomic
systems. Unfortunately, transgovernmental networks do not provide the level of
cooperation needed to effect cross-border supervision. This is not to say that
transgovernmental networks lack value. They remain useful in building
consensus among regulators about key principles and standards. Effective global
financial regulation, however, requires more powerful international legal
frameworks and instruments that go beyond transgovernmental networks.
This Article advocates an international administrative law model for
financial regulation. It advocates the creation of an international body that has

10

See Eric J. Pan, Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform, Benjamin Cardozo School of Law
http://papers.ssm.com/
online
at
2009),
280
(Dec
No
Paper
Working
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1521504 (visited Mar 22, 2010) (explaining the importance of
supervision to the financial crisis).

11

See, for example, Group of Twenty, G20 Leaders' Declaration, Summit on FinancialMarkets and the
online at
(Nov 15, 2008),
World Economy ("G20 Washington Communiqu6")
www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summitdeclaration.pdf (visited May 3, 2010) ("We pledge to
strengthen our regulatory regimes, prudential oversight, and risk management, and ensure that all
financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to
their circumstances.").
See name of source text accompanying notes 119-32.

12
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the power and resources to supervise cross-border financial institutions, demand
action by national supervisors, promulgate supervisory standards, conduct
inspections, and initiate enforcement proceedings. Acknowledging possible
objections to an international administrative law model, particularly those related
to the protection of state sovereignty and democratic accountability, this Article
argues that the formation of an international administrative agency is better
suited to the problem of global financial regulation and should garner support
from key states. This Article admires in particular the structural reform
proposals being adopted by the EU and the creation of new European System
of Financial Supervisors. While recognizing that the EU represents a unique
phenomenon in international law, this paper argues that the international
community should look to the EU experience for a model of greater
international cooperation.
The development of a new international administrative law regime to
govern financial regulation and supervision has significant implications for the
development of international law. While this Article focuses primarily on
financial regulation and describing an international legal framework for global
financial supervision, the model proposed would be applicable to any regulatory
problem that involves oversight, enforcement, and inspection of private actors
by a public body. To the extent international administrative law regimes can
assume a greater role in the regulation of key economic and social sectors-as
they must in a globalizing society-they represent new and prolific sources of
international law.
Part II of the Article examines the current international financial
architecture. It offers an account of the limitations of the architecture. Part III
discusses the problem of financial supervision. It explains how the financial
crisis showed the inadequacy of frameworks for supervising cross-border
financial institutions and the limitations of the current international financial
architecture. Part IV sets forth an international administrative law model for
financial regulation. It addresses common objections to the international
administrative law model and considers the possibility that such an international
legal regime can be established. The Conclusion reflects on how the
development of new international legal tools to solve the financial regulatory
problem may influence the future development of international law.
II. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE
The current international financial architecture consists broadly of five
different types of international legal frameworks, as depicted in Table 1. These
frameworks range from formal international organizations, as epitomized by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, to periodic state-to-state
contact groups, like the G8 or G20, to transgovernmental networks, to informal
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bilateral and regional arrangements between national regulators, and to private
standards setting bodies.
A review of the different legal frameworks that make up the international
financial architecture shows that regulatory cooperation takes place
predominantly through the transgovernmental networks, but these networks rely
heavily on political bargains struck at the level of state-to-state contact groups.
Consequently, the international financial architecture provides a suboptimal
regulatory framework for the international financial markets, generating a need
for stronger international regulatory bodies.

International
Organizations

State-to-State
Contact
Groups

Transgovernmental
Networks

Bilateral and
Regional
Networks

Private
Standards
Setting

IMF
World Bank

G20/Gn8

FSB
Basel

FMRD

IASB
ISDA

MOU/
Informal;
small
secretariat;
information
sharing; policy
coordination;
policy
administration
Rules and
standards
related to
banking,
securities,
insurance,
foreign
investment

MOU/
Informal

Private
sector
experts

Market
access;
rules and
standards;
mutual
recognition

Technical
standards

Basel ll;
international
disclosure
standards for
cross-border
offerings

IFRS
accounting
roadmap

IFRS;
ISDA
Master
Agreement

Bodies

Examples

IOSCO
IAIS

WTO

OECD

Characteristics

Treaty-based;
large
secretariat;
limited
policymaking;
policy
administration

Political; no
secretariat;
policymaking

Regulatory
Tasks

Sovereign
loans;
economic
development
and technical
assistance;
international
trade; market
access

Crisis
response;
creation of
networks

Examples of
Achievements

Creation of
Basel and
FSB

IMF = International Monetary Fund
WTO = World Trade Organization
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G20 = Group of Twenty
G8 = Group of Eight
FMRD = US-EU Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue
FSB = Financial Stability Board
Basel = Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
IOSCO = International Organization of Securities Commissions
IAIS = International Association of Insurance Commissioners
OECD = Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development

IASB
ISDA

International Accounting Standards Board
International Swaps and Derivatives Association

Table 1 - International Financial Architecture

A. International Organizations
Much has changed since the leading economic powers, meeting in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire in 1944, conceived of three international organizations
to manage the international economy-the IMF, World Bank, and International
Trade Organization (implemented in spirit through the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and eventually as the World Trade Organization (WTO))."
The international financial markets have become to a great extent private
markets. The main sources and distributors of capital are now private entities,
whether commercial banks, retail and institutional investors, or private
investment funds. States now participate in the international financial markets as
4
if they were private actors. Governments market their debt to private investors.1
They submit themselves to the judgment of private credit rating agencies that
opine on governments' credit worthiness." They rely on private investment
13

14

15

See, for example, Orin Kirshner, Introduction in Orkin Krishner, ed, The Bretton Woods-GATT
System: Reptrospect and ProspectAfter Ffy Years ix (ME Sharpe 1996) ("Put simply, the IMF, the
World Bank, and the GATT were created to address the global problems of the 1920s and 1930s,
not the problems we face today."). See also Simon Reisman, The Birth of the World Trading System:
ITO and GATT, in Orin Kirshner, ed, The Bretton Woods-GATT System 82 (ME Sharpe 1996)
(describing the conception of the ITO and the rise of GATI.
See, for example, Treasury Direct, online at http://www.treasurydirect.gov (visited Mar 22, 2010)
(offering US Treasury securities directly to private investors as well as providing information on
how to purchase through the more traditional route of using a bank or broker).
See, for example, Hiroko Tabuchi and Bettina Wassener, Japan's High Debt Prompts Credit Rating
(Jan 26, 2010) online at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
Warning, NY Times
01/27/business/global/27yen.html (visited Mar 22, 2010) ("A leading credit rating agency
threatened Tuesday to downgrade Japan's rating unless the world's second largest economy took
more steps to rein in its mounting public debt.") (emphasis added); Standard & Poor's Ratings,
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banks to provide underwriting and other financial advisory services." They hire
private law and consulting firms to provide transaction advice." Governments
also are active as investors in the private markets. Government investment
funds-particularly the so-called sovereign wealth funds-participate in the
capital markets right next to, and sometimes in combination with, private
investment funds." As the international financial markets have become private
markets, the most pressing international finance questions facing the
international community have shifted from how to facilitate state-based
financing and maintain a stable foreign exchange regime to how to regulate
cross-border transactions by private firms and persons and ensure the safety and
soundness of the financial institutions and intermediaries that operate the
financial markets.
The objectives of the IMF and World Bank were to encourage monetary
policy cooperation, ensure currency convertibility, extend credit for post-war
recovery efforts and provide loans and other financial and technical assistance to
member countries." Both institutions are international organizations. 20 They
have formal powers set forth by treaty,2 enjoy large, permanent staff, and have

16

17

18

19

Sovereign Ratings List, online at http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/ratingslist/en/us/?sectorName=Governments&subSectorCode=39 (visited Mar 22, 2010) (providing
Standards & Poors credit ratings for all government issued debts).
See, for example, Louise Story, Landon Thomas Jr., and Nelson Schwartz, Wall St Helped to Mask
Debts Shaking Europe, NY Times Al (Feb 14, 2010) (describing financial services and advice
provided by certain US-based investment banks to Greece and other European countries).
See, for example, Amy Kolz, Nice Work . . If You Can Get It, American Lawyer 104 (Jan 2009)
(describing the sizeable business enjoyed by law firms that represent sovereign wealth funds);
White & Case LLP, Press Release, Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia to Buy SAR1O Billion of
Notes fmm Sabic in Largest Saudi Corporate Note Issue of 2009 (Jan 6, 2010), online at
http://www.whitecase.com/press-01062010/ (visited Mar 22, 2010) (detailing a transaction in
which a US law firm collaborated with a Saudi attorney to advise the Public Investment Fund of
Saudi Arabia on its purchase of notes issued by a Saudi corporation).
See Richard A. Epstein and Amanda M. Rose, The Going-private Phenomenon: The Regulation
of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow, 76 U Chi L Rev 111, 117 (2009).
See Kirshner, The Bretton Woods-GATT System at x-xi (cited in note 13).

20

International organizations generally share the same three characteristics. See Jose E. Alvarez,
International OrganiZations as Lzw-makers 4-7 (Oxford 2005); Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe,
Principles of the Institutional Law of International OrganiZations 9 (Cambridge 2d ed 2005). First, all
international organizations must be formed by an agreement between states, usually, but not
always, taking the form of a multilateral treaty or convention. Second, international organizations
must have an organ or body capable of acting independently of their constituent states. This
requirement is sometimes referred to as having a "legal personality." See Henry G. Schermers and
Neils M. Blokker, International Institutional Law 26, 34 (Martinus Nijhoff 4th ed 2003). Finally,
international organizations must be established under international law. See id at 36-37.

21

The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF Agreement") were
conceived on July 22, 1944 at the United Nations Monetary Fund Conference in Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire. The International Monetary Fund was founded on December 27, 1945 when
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the ability to make policy through organs composed of representatives from
member states.22
The third major international organization in the international financial
architecture is the WTO. What has distinguished the WTO from the IMF and
the World Bank has been its successful enforcement of international legal
principles of trade liberalization through a robust dispute resolution system. The
success of the WTO's dispute resolution system to adjudicate claims between
states and ensure compliance of its decisions represents a major international law
achievement. The WTO, through the General Agreement on Trade and Services
(GATS), also has a direct role to play in the setting of market access rules for the
provision of cross border financial services. However, the GATS affords little
assurance that market access will be linked to uniformly high standards of
prudential supervision.23
Despite their vast legal powers, sizeable bureaucracies and substantial
resources, the IMF, World Bank and WTO play only a supporting role in the
management of the international financial system.24 The main reason for their
limited role is that they lack the necessary legal powers and expertise to serve as
financial regulators. A financial regulator must have the capacity to monitor
markets and market participants, the expertise to identify problems and
formulate regulatory responses, the authority to promulgate rules and standards,
and the ability to implement and enforce such rules and standards. The IMF and
World Bank arguably possess the technical expertise and resources to serve as
financial regulators,2 5 but they lack the legal competence.2 Likewise, the WTO,

22

23

24
25

the Articles went into force. See also Joseph Gold, Legal and InstitutionalAspectsof the International
Monetag System 238-291 (IMF 1979).
The IMF, for example, has two governing bodies: the Board of Governors and the Executive
Board. See IMF Agreement Art I, § 1 (cited in note 21). The Board of Governors, composed of a
representative from each member state, is the highest ranking decision-making body at the IMF.
See id, Art I, 5 2. The Executive Board is responsible for carrying out the functions of the IMF.
See id, Art I, 5 3(a). Members elect the directors who serve on the Executive Board with five seats
reserved to the states with the largest contribution quotas. See id, Art XII, §3(b)(i)-(ii).
See Joel P. Trachtman, Trade in FinancialServices under GATS, NAFTA and the EC: A Regulatoy
Jurisdiction Analysis, 34 Colum J Transnatl L 37 (1995) (discussing how GATS would require
countries to provide market access to foreign financial service providers at the expense of tough
prudential regulatory requirements on foreign supervised financial institutions); Sydney J. Key,
Trade LiberaliZation and PrudentialRegulation: The International Frameworkfor FinancialSerzices, 75 Intl
Affairs 61 (1999) (discussing the need to accompany any liberalization of trade in financial
services with common agreements on regulatory and supervisory standards).
See Zaring, 10 Chi J Int L at 488-94 (cited in note 1).
See Report of the Working Group on StrengtheningFinancialSystems (Oct 1998) (recommending the IMF
be charged with banking system surveillance, drawing upon expertise from the World Bank);
International Monetary Fund, Declarationof G7 FinanceMinisters and CentralBank Governors(Oct 30,
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through GATS, arguably has potential legal authority to regulate the provision of
cross-border financial services, but lacks the technical competence.27 Further, all
three international organizations are hampered by the inflexibility of their treaty
regimes and plenary bodies to broaden their legal authority and engage in the
active rulemaking and supervisory acts necessary to regulate private financial
transactions and actors.28
B. State-to-State Contact Groups
With international financial institutions unable to fill the role of global
financial regulator, a diverse group of legal frameworks has emerged to carry out
different aspects of the role.29 As shown in Table 1, this group consists broadly
of four different types of legal frameworks. The first framework is one that can
be best described as "state-to-state" contact groups. Prime examples of state-tostate contact groups are the various "G-groups." G-groups refer to the regularly
scheduled meetings of ministers and heads of government of the largest and
wealthiest countries of the world. Such groups include the G7, G8, G10 and
most recently the G20.30 G-groups do not operate pursuant to any legal
instrument. Their decisions are entirely consensual and take the form of political
statements as opposed to legally binding agreements. Through repeated

26

27

28

29

30

1998), online at http://www.imf.org/external/np/g7/103098dc.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010)
(expressing support for IMF surveillance of the international financial sector).
Some argue that the IMF has the ability to monitor financial systems pursuant to Article IV of the
IMF Article of Agreement. See, for example, Christopher Brummer, How InternaionalFinandal
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/
online
(And How it Doesn't) 63-64,
Law
Works
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1542829 (visited Mar 22, 2010). The problem with this approach is
that Article IV does not permit the IMF to conduct surveillance of private firms, which would be
necessary for prudential supervision and systemic risk regulation.
See Kern Alexander, The GATS and Financial Services: Liberalisation and Regulation in Global
Financial Markets, in Kern Alexander and Mads Andenas eds, The World Trade Organization and
Trade in Services 561, 564, 568 (Martinus Nijhoff 2008); Rolf H. Weber and Douglas W. Arner,
Toward a New Design for International Financial Regulation, 29 U Pa J Intl L 391, 426-27 (2007)
(discussing limitations of GATS in opening access to cross-border financial services).
For an analysis of the problems that face treaty-based regimes attempting to serve as
administrative agencies, see Eric J. Pan, Authoitaive Interpretaion of Agreements: Developing More
Responsive InternaionalAdministrativeRegimes, 38 Harv Intl L J 503 (1997). See also Debra P. Steger,
The Future of the WTO: The Casefor InstitutonalReform, 12 J Intl Econ L 803 (2009) (arguing for a
management or executive body in the WTO that would permit for greater and more efficient
rulemaking powers).
See Joseph J. Norton, Comment on the Developing Transnational Network(s) in the Area of
International Financial Regulation: The Underpinnings of a New Bretton Woods II Global
Financial System Framework, 43 Intl Law 175, 180-81 (2009).
See, for example, Andrew Baker, The Groip of Seven: Finance Ministries, Central Banks and Global
Financial Governance 3-4, 19-37 (Routledge 2006); Carlos M. Pelaez and Carlos A. Pelaez,
InternationalFinandalArchitecture66-67 (Palgrave 2005).
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interaction, the G-groups represent a powerful state-centric network.3 ' And they
play a crucial role in the international financial architecture by providing the
necessary political agreements to empower a number of less formal legal
networks to serve as de facto regulators of the global financial system.
For example, in 1974 the G1 3 2 established the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), in response to the foreign exchange
settlement crisis caused by the failure of the Herstatt Bank in Germany." The
initial purposes of the Basel Committee were to facilitate the exchange of
information between the bank regulators of the Basel Committee members and
to issue guidelines concerning the proper handling of banking crises. In 1999,
the G7 reacted to the Asian and Russian financial crises by creating the Financial
Stability Forum (FSF). 4 The FSF's purpose was "to ensure that national and
international authorities and relevant international supervisory bodies and expert
groupings [could] more effectively foster and coordinate their respective
responsibilities to promote international financial stability, improve the
functioning of the markets and reduce systemic risk."35 In response to the recent
financial crisis, the G20 replaced the FSF with the Financial Stability Board
(FSB).36 The G20 charged the FSB with a "strengthened mandate" 37 compared
to the FSF, so it would assume a "central role in coordinating [the] agenda" to
further global financial supervision and regulation.3 ' This agenda includes
strengthening systemic risk regulation, implementing counter-cyclical capital
requirements, developing common principles for remuneration and dealing with
tax havens and non-cooperative jurisdictions.3 ' Thus, G-groups rely heavily on
informal regulatory networks like Basel and FSB to carry out the task of
developing global standards.

31

See generally id.

32

G10 consists of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK and US.

33

See Joseph D. Becker, Transnationallnsolveng Transformed, 29 Am

34

See University of Toronto G8 Information Centre, Communiqud of G7 Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors 15 (Feb 20, 1999), online at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm022099.htm
(visited Mar 22, 2010).

35

Id. See also Financial Stability Board, History, online at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
about/history.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010).

36

See London Communiqud ofthe Leaders ofthe G20, M 15-16 (cited in note 6).

37

Seeid,

38

The London Summit, ExplanatoU Guide to the Communiqui, online at http://www.
londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-aims/communique-explanation/ (visited Mar 22, 2010).

39

See id.

J Comp L 706

(1981).

15.
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C. Transgovernmental Networks
Many of the frameworks set up by the G-groups fall within the third
category of legal frameworks identified in Table 1: transgovernmental networks.
Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Zaring define transgovernmental networks as
the links between sub-state actors, such as regulatory agencies, that "allow
domestic officials to interact with their foreign counterparts directly, without
much supervision by foreign offices or senior executive branch officials . . . ."40
Transgovernmental networks derive strength not from treaties or other state-tostate agreements. Instead, transgovernmental networks operate through frequent
interaction between these sub-state actors, encouraging information sharing,
development of common concepts, and cooperation in solving mutual
problems.4 1 As Kal Raustiala noted, these networks "are 'transgovernmental'
because they involve specialized domestic officials directly interacting with each
other, often with minimal supervision by foreign ministries. They are 'networks'
because this cooperation is based on loosely-structured, peer-to-peer ties
developed through frequent interaction rather than formal negotiation. 4 2
Transgovernmental network theory is rooted in the belief that globalization
has rendered the traditional approaches of domestic actors and regulators
inadequate to deal with certain issues in which states have become increasingly
interdependent, such as financial and environmental regulation.43 In order to
effectively regulate and manage these issues, states are "disaggregating into ...
separate, functionally distinct parts" such as courts, regulatory agencies, and
even legislatures." As these parts begin to interact on a regular basis with their
foreign counterparts, they develop a network where they take it upon themselves
40
41

42

43

44

Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Zaring, Networking Goes International:An Update, 2 Ann Rev of L
and Soc Sci 211 (2006).
Transgovernmental network theory relies heavily on the existence of epistemic communities
whose members share normative beliefs and a common policy enterprise. Members of epistemic
communities share information, interpret such information, and ultimately form networks and
institutionalize their relationships to coordinate policy. See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic
Communities and InternationalPoliy Coordination,46 Intl Org 1, 3-4 (1992).
Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl L at 5 (cited in note 4). Transnational law, the law governing the
"relationships between nonstate actors" has been studied since at least the 1950s. See Slaughter
and Zaring, 2 Ann Rev of L and Soc Sci at 213 (cited in note 40). In the 1970s the term
"transgovernmental relations" was coined by international relations scholars to define
"relationships between government officials 'that are not controlled or closely guided by the
policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments . . . ."' Id at 212-13 (quoting
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, TransnationalRelationsand World Politics 428 (Harvard 1972)).
See Slaughter, A New World Orderat 8-11 (cited in note 4); see also Raustiala, Va J Intl L at 11-16
(cited in note 4) (citing "technological innovation," "the rise of the regulatory state," and
"globalization" as the root cause of the "rise of networks.")
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order,Foreign Affairs 183, 184 (Sept/Oct 1997).
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to share information, agree on common principles and generate legal norms.
The more successful transgovernmental networks manage a convergence of
national rules and standards to develop global rules and standards that are in
turn implemented into local law. Governments and international organizations
can facilitate the development of transgovernmental networks by providing fora
for sub-state entity interaction and institutional support for information
dissemination.
Although transgovernmental networks can stand alone, they also
complement the efforts of traditional international organizations by facilitating
convergence or "deeper cooperation through more formal international
45
agreements" and enhancing compliance with existing international agreements.
In addition, transnational governmental networks serve as aggregators of
information and clearinghouses for the sharing of technical expertise,
influencing the development of future treaties and international agreements.
Recognizing the expertise of transgovernmental networks, states and
international organizations look to such networks for help in developing new
policies.46
Three noteworthy examples of financial regulatory transgovernmental
networks are the Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) and the FSF.47 The Basel Committee provides a forum
for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters with the objective to
enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of
banking supervision worldwide.4 8 Its membership consists of representatives of
national banks and finance departments from twenty-six countries and Hong
Kong. 49 These members make decisions by consensus.so It has a small secretariat
staffed primarily by regulators on temporary assignment from member states.
Basel's noteworthy achievements include the Basel Concordat," Core Principles

45
46

See Slaughter and Zaring, 2 Ann Rev of L and Soc Sci at 225 (cited in note 40).
The IMF, for example, embraced the 1997 Basel Core Principles for Surveillance of Banking and
Surveillance Systems and urged its members to adopt the principles, even though many of the
members were not members of Basel. See David Folkerts-Landau and Carl-Johan Lindgren,

Toward a FrameworkforFinandalStability (IMF 1998).
47

For more information about Basel and IOSCO as examples of transgovernmental networks,
please see Zaring, 5 Chi J Intl L at 554-69 (cited in note 4).

48

Id.

49

its
and
Basel
Committee
of
the
History
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (visited Apr 23, 2010).

50

Zaring, 5 Chi J Intl L at 555 (cited in note 4).

51

Basel Committee, Pincaplesfor the Supenirion of Banks' Foreign Establishments ("Concordat") (May
1983), online at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc3l2.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010).
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for Effective Supervision,52 and the Revised Framework on International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II). 3 Despite
its lack of formal legal powers, Basel has been effective in setting forth principles
and promulgating standards that have been widely accepted and implemented by
bank regulators around the world, including regulators of countries that are not
members of Basel. 54
The IOSCO is an affiliation of national securities regulators and private
securities regulators with a four-fold mandate: (1) promote high regulatory
standards; (2) exchange information on past experiences to promote
development of domestic markets; (3) establish standards for and surveillance of
international securities transactions; and (4) provide mutual assistance for
enforcement activities." Like Basel, IOSCO has no formal legal powers and a
minimal staff. It is effectively a series of meetings of regulators where members
pass non-binding resolutions by consensus." As in the case of Basel, IOSCO has
been successful in promulgating standards that have found wide acceptance
among national regulators. For example, through IOSCO, regulators agreed on a
common standard of international disclosure for cross-border offerings."
IOSCO continues to produce numerous papers and reports on a wide range of
issues affecting the international securities markets including market surveillance,
hedge fund regulation and auditing standards.
The FSF is another example of a transgovernmental network. The FSF's
objective was to bring together national financial stability regulators,
52

Basel Committee, Core Pinnables for Effective Banking Supension (Sept 22, 1997), online at
http://www.bis.org/press/p970922.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010).

53

Basel Committee, Basel II: International Convergence of CapitalMeasurement And Capital Standards: a
Revised Framework (June 2004), online at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm (visited Mar 22,
2010).

54

55

See, for example, Implementation of the New CapitalAdequacy Framework in Non-Basel Committee Member
Countries (Bank for International Settlements Financial Stability Institute Occasional Paper No 4,
July 2004), online at http://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers04.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010) (reporting
that at least 88 jurisdictions that are not members of the Basel Committee intend to implement
Basel II).
See International Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"), General Information on

56

IOSCO, online at http://www.iosco.org/about (visited Mar 22, 2010); IOSCO, Structure of the
Organization, online at http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=structure (visited Mar 22,
2010).
See Zaring, 5 Chi J Intl L at 565 (cited in note 4).

57

See, for example, IOSCO, InternationalDisclosure Standardsfor Cross-BorderOfferings and Initial Listings
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/
(Sept
1998),
online
at
by
Foreign
Issuers
oia/oia-corpfin/crossborder.pdf (visited Mar 22, 2010). See also Securities and Exchange
Commission, International Disclosure Standards Release No 3441936 (Sept 30, 1999), online at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-41936.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010) (adopting revised Form 20F containing disclosure requirements proposed by IOSCO).
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international regulatory bodies, international financial institutions, and market
infrastructure experts to cooperate on measures that would promote the stability
of the international financial system.ss In November 2008, the leaders of the
G20 nations called to expand the membership of the FSF," and the Forum was
reestablished as the FSB in April 2009.60 The FSB currently is comprised of fiftytwo national regulatory agencies representing twenty-four nations along with
twelve international agencies charged with financial stability regulation and
standard-setting.'
The contributions of the FSF and FSB have been largely informational and
advisory. For example at its first meeting in April 1999, the FSF established a
Working Group on Offshore Financial Centers, which submitted its report to
the full FSF membership in April 2000.62 Based on this group's findings, the FSF
issued its own report the next month in which it listed five criteria for evaluating
jurisdictions: (1) cross-border cooperation on information exchange; (2)
underlying supervision; (3) degree of due diligence in financial institutions; (4)
availability of information about beneficial ownership; and (5) availability of data
on financial activities. 3 Another example is the Working Group on Market and
Institutional Resilience established by the FSF in 2008. This Working Group
focused regulating risk-management practices, valuation, risk disclosure and
accounting, credit rating agencies, and prudential oversight.6 4 The Working
Group's charge was to evaluate these issues with a view to diagnosing the causes
of systemic instability, identifying weaknesses for policymakers to address, and

58

59

See
Financial
Stability
Board,
About
the
FSB:
History,
online
at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010) (cited in note
35).
See G20, Washington Communiqui (cited in note 11).

60

See G20, London Communiqui (cited in note 6).

61

See
Financial
Stability
Board,
Links
to
FSB
Members,
online
at
(visited Mar 22, 2010). Besides
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm
IOSCO and the Basel Committee, the international institutions sitting on the board are the Bank
for International Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Coordination and Development,
the World Bank, the Committee on the Global Financial System, the Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, and the International
Accounting Standards Board.
See Financial Stability Forum, Report of the Working Group on Offshore Centres (Apr 5, 2000), online at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r-0004b.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010).
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See id,

64

See Financial Stability Forum, Report of the Financial Stabilty Forum on Enhancing Market and
Institutional Resilience (Apr 7, 2008), online at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
list/fsbpublications/tid1 10/page_2.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010).
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recommending solutions." Since its reconstitution, the FSB has already released
over fourteen publications by February 2010, primarily dealing with systemic risk
issues exposed during the recent financial crisis." As in the case of Basel and
IOSCO, the FSB uses its power as a hub of regulatory expertise to influence
regulatory actions in member states. It does not rely on, nor appears to need,
formal legal powers to carry out its function.
D. Bilateral and Regional Networks
In addition to transgovernmental networks, two other legal frameworks
play an important role in regulating the international financial markets. One
framework may be best described as bilateral and regional networks." Bilateral
and regional networks refer to close cooperative arrangements between two or
more states to address specific regulatory problems. These cooperative
arrangements often involve both political and regulatory representatives and
tackle issues that have not been addressed by the relevant transgovernmental
networks. These bilateral and regional networks produce commitments by states
to assume certain regulatory stances even though they do not rely on states
entering into any binding agreements. Instead, parties tend to rely on soft law
instruments ranging from memoranda of understanding to oral commitments
and joint press releases. These bilateral and regional networks frequently achieve
more substantial results on a wider range of issues because they involve
discussions of a smaller number of states.
Two examples that illustrate the operation of such bilateral and regional
networks are the US-EU Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue (FMRD)" and
the US-Australia memorandum of understanding on the mutual recognition of
broker-dealers (US-Australia MOU).6 ' The FMRD originated from an agreement
65

Id.

66

See Financial Stability Board, Publications, online at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/
fsb-publications/index.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010).
See, for example, Julia Black and David Rouch, The Development of the Global Markets as Rule Makers:

67

68

69

Engagement and Legitimacy, 2 Law and Fin Markets Rev 218, 219-20 (2008) (discussing the impact
of bilateral and regional dialogues on cross-border standards setting).
See Olivier Girard, Financial Regulation: Is Transatlantic Cooperation Still Relevant?, 4 Euredia
577 (2009); Kern Alexander, Eilis Ferran, Howell Jackson and Niamh Moloney, A Report on the
Transatlantic Financial Services Regulatory Dialogue 647-73 (Olin Center for Law, Economics,
and Business Discussion Paper No 576, Jan 2007), online at http://www.law.
harvard.edu/programs/olincenter/papers/576Jackson-et%/20al.php (visited Mar 22, 2010).
See Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release: SEC, Australian Authorities Sign Mutual
Recognition Agreement (Aug 25, 2008), online at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008182.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010). For a perspective on the significance of this new approach to
cross-border regulation, see Eric J. Pan, The New Intemationalitation of US Securities Regulation:
Improving the Prospectsfor a Trans-Atlantic Markeplace (Benjamin Cardozo School of Law Working
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made at a state-to-state contact group, in this case the 2002 US-EU Summit.70
The FMRD consists of a series of formal and informal meetings between senior
policymakers and regulators from the US and the European Commission.7 ' The
agenda for these meetings consists of sharing information about the
development of regulatory policy in each other's jurisdictions, resolving
regulatory conflicts, and promoting regulatory convergence and harmonization.72
Issues addressed by the FMRD include agreeing on a process to converge US
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles with International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS), the establishment of a supervisory authority in the
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to oversee non-bank financial
conglomerates to match EU requirements on financial conglomerate
supervision, and new rules governing deregistration by foreign private issuers.
The FMRD produces an intense level of cooperation between the US and the
EU across a broad range of financial regulatory issues.
A different, but equally useful example of a bilateral and regional network
is the US-Australia MOU. In 2008, the SEC held discussions with its
counterparts in Australia, Canada and the EU regarding the regulation of brokerdealers.74 The discussions' purpose was to negotiate a mutual recognition
arrangement, pursuant to which broker-dealers, including stock exchanges,
would be permitted to offer services to investors in the other jurisdiction based
upon the strength of the supervision of the broker-dealer's home regulator. The

Paper No 217, 2008); Howell E. Jackson, Toward a New Regulatory Paradigmfor the Trans-Atlantic
Financial Market and Beyond: Legal and Economic Perspectives (2008),
online
at
(visited
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/workshops/open/papers0708/jackson.paper.pdf
May 3, 2010).
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See Girard, 4 Euredia at 579 (cited in note 68).
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See id.
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See US Treasury, Remarks by US Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs
Randal K. Quarles, The US-EU Posiive Economic Agenda on FinancialMarkets Issues (Dec 10, 2002),
online at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3677.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010); Girard, 4
Euredia at 580 (cited in note 68).
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See Girard, 4 Euredia at 579 (cited in note 68).
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See, for example, Press Release: SEC, Australian Authorities Sign Mutual Recognition Agreement
(cited in note 69); Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release: Schedule Announced for
Completion of US-Canadian Mutual Recognition Process Agreement (May 29, 2008), online at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-98.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010); Securities and
Exchange Commission, Press Release: Statement of the European Commission and the US
Securities and Exchange Commission on Mutual Recognition in Securities Markets (Feb 1, 2008),
online at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-9.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010). For a
perspective on the significance of this new approach to cross-border regulation, see Pan, Working
Paper No 217 at 73 (cited in note 69); Ethiopis Tafara and Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for
Cross-Border Access to US Investors: A New International Framework, 48 Harv Intl L J 31
(2007).
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SEC completed discussions only with Australia. What makes the US-Australia
MOU constitute a network is that this non-binding agreement governs an ongoing and dynamic relationship between two regulators. As a basis for mutual
recognition, the regulators must agree that broker-dealers will be held to
equivalent standards of conduct and regulation. Regulators must perform
comparability studies to evaluate the effectiveness of each other's supervision.
To the extent differences exist, regulators must converge or harmonize their
requirements.75 More importantly, a mutual recognition arrangement requires
16
continuous sharing of information and on-going regulatory cooperation. As
part of the arrangement, the US and Australia entered into two additional
memoranda of understanding to govern closer enforcement and supervisory
cooperation. By arranging for cooperative supervision and enforcement, the
US-Australia MOU is distinct from other mutual recognition arrangements that
limit themselves to single determinations concerning the adequacy of foreign
regulatory requirements. An example of such a limited mutual recognition
arrangement is the US-Canada Multijurisdictional Disclosure System. Pursuant
to system, Canadian issuers are permitted to offer securities in the US based
upon disclosure documents prepared in accordance with Canadian
75

76

With respect to exchanges, the foreign regulatory regime must ensure that its exchanges have
rules and procedures that prevent fraud and manipulation (including insider trading), put into
place surveillance, audit and internal control systems, follow the principle of best execution of
customer orders, and have in place certain enforcement and disciplinary mechanisms similar to
those required of US self-regulatory organizations. Foreign exchanges also must maintain
appropriate systems to ensure continuity of market operations, meet the same standards of price
transparency and offer fair access to all qualified broker-dealers. Foreign broker-dealers likewise
will be expected to meet the same standards as their US counterparts. They will be expected to
meet similar standards of competency, satisfy similar financial responsibility requirements
(including the maintenance of sufficient capital reserves, safeguarding of customer funds and
keeping of records), and follow similar sales practice standards (including ensuring best execution
of customer orders and providing sufficient disclosure to customers about trades).
Another example of such level of cooperation is the decision by the European Commission to
recognize the adequacy of the auditor oversight systems in Canada. See European Commission,
Commission Decision on the Adequag of the Competent Authorities of Certain Third Countries Pursuantto
Directive 2006/43/EC, online at www.europolitics.info/pdf/gratuit.en/265787-en.pdf (visited

May 3, 2010).
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See Securities and Exchange Commission, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning
Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Related to the Enforcement of
at
online
3,
2008),
(May
Laws
Securities
www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia-mutualrecognition/australia/enhanced-enforcementmou.
pdf (visited Apr 13, 2010); Securities and Exhange Commission, Memorandum of Understanding
between the US Securities and Exchange Commission and Australian Securities and Investments
Commission Concerning Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information Related to
Market Oversight and the Supervision of Financial Services Firms (Aug 25, 2008), online at
www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia.mutual.recognition/australia/enhanced-enforcementmou.
pdf (visited May 3, 2010).
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requirements." As such mutual recognition arrangements do not demand ongoing cooperation between regulators, they fall short of establishing a network."
Bilateral and regional networks are significant because they provide for a
more intensive level of regulatory cooperation than either state-to-state contact
groups or transgovernmental networks.8 0 Bilateral and regional cooperation may
provide the initial step to the emergence of a more ambitious international
administrative law regime. The optimal conditions for cooperation between
regulators occur when there already exists a mutual understanding between
regulators that comes about through familiarity with each other's regulatory
frameworks, markets, and regulatory approaches. Thus, it is more likely for
regulators to cooperate in an effective manner if they focus on developing
bilateral, as opposed to multilateral, cooperative relationships. Consider, for
example, how an agreement between the US and the UK pressured other
countries to accept an international capital adequacy standard. In the mid-1980s
the US and UK became frustrated with and eventually abandoned efforts to
negotiate a single capital adequacy standard through the G10. They instead
entered into a bilateral agreement on capital adequacy. Given the size of the US
and UK banking markets, the other G10 countries recognized that the US-UK
capital adequacy standard would become the de facto global standard. As a
result, within a year of the announcement of a US-UK agreement, the rest of the
G10 joined negotiations to produce the first Basel Accord.'
In the current environment, the development of the FMRD into a robust
bilateral framework between the US and the EU would greatly enhance the
prospect for the development of more powerful international regulatory
regimes.82 Given the size of the US and EU financial markets, any cooperative
regulatory framework relationship that develops between the US and EU likely

78

See Securities and Exchange Commission, Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the
Current Registration and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, 56 Fed Reg 30036 (1991).
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Of course, the fact regulators may enter into such mutual recognition arrangements may reflect
the fact that a network already exists.
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See, for example, Girard, 4 Euredia at 586 (cited in note 68) (noting that the work of the FMRD
is very technical can be better handled through bilateral forums like the FMRD than larger bodies
like the FSB).
See Ethan Barnaby Kapstein, Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of
Regulatory Convergence, 46 Intl Org 265 (1992).
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The importance of bilateral regulatory cooperation between the US and EU has been noted by

George A. Bermann in Regulatoy Cooperation Between the Eumpean Commission and US Administrative
Agenies, 9 Admin LJ 933 (1996).
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would set the dominant framework for regulation of cross-border institutions
for the rest of the world.
E. Private Standards Setting Bodies
A final type of legal network is the private standards setting body. Private
standards setting bodies consist entirely of multijurisdictional, non-state actors.
They play a key role in the international financial architecture by providing
highly technical regulation in regulatory spaces that have either been ceded by
national regulators or have fallen outside the scope of national regulation. In
many cases, the power of private standards setting bodies stems from states'
willingness to recognize or endorse these private standards. 84
Two prominent, yet different, examples of such networks are the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA). Part of a private, non-profit corporation,
IASB plays a key role in the international financial architecture by overseeing the
development and interpretation of IFRS." IFRS is the most widely accepted
accounting standards in the world, with more than one hundred countries
allowing or requiring companies to prepare their financial statements in
accordance with IFRS."
ISDA is a global trade association representing the leading participants in
the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives industry. Operating as a New York notfor-profit corporation, ISDA has 850 member institutions from fifty-eight

83

Girard, 4 Euredia at 586-87 (cited in note 68) (arguing that it is in the interest of the US and EU
to develop common positions in the FMRD and then push these positions in international fora
like the FSB and G20).

4

See, for example, G20 Washington Communiqud (cited in note 11) (requesting IASB to develop a
global accounting standard).

85

See Andreas M. Fleckner, FASB and IASB: Dependence Despite Independence, 3 Va L & Bus Rev 275,
281-83 (2008).
International Accounting Standards Board, Global Convergence of 1FRSs, online at

86

http://www.iasb.org/Use+around+the+world/Global+convergence/IFRS+global+convergence
.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010). "[Imhe remaining major economies have established timelines for
convergence with, or adoption of, IFRSs." Id. The US has even demonstrated receptiveness to
use of IFRSs, permitting foreign issuers to abide by these standards and expressing the possibility
of extending it to domestic issuers. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Acceptance from
ForeignPrivate Issuers of FinancialStatements Preparedin Accordance with InternationalFinancialReportng
Standards Without Reconciliation to US GAAP, 17 CFR % 210, 230, 239, 249 (2008). See also
Securities and Exchange Commission, PressRelease: SEC Proposes Roadmap Toward GlobalAccounting
Standards to Help Investors Compare Financial Information More Easiy (Aug 27, 2008), online at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-184.htm (visited Mar 22, 2010).
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countries spanning six continents." ISDA's purpose is to develop standards and
practices to help decrease sources of risk in the conduct of OTC derivative
transactions." One of ISDA's most important contributions to the international
financial architecture is the development of the ISDA Master Agreement. First
published in 1987 and subsequently revised in 1992 and 2002, the ISDA Master
Agreement mitigates legal uncertainty and credit risk by creating international
contractual standards for a range of privately negotiated derivatives
transactions. 9 In addition to its Master Agreement, the ISDA publishes
Confirmations (to document the economic terms of the transactions),
Definitions, Credit Support documents, User's Guides, and Protocols (to amend
the Master Agreement)."o Together the IASB and the ISDA provide valuable
regulatory services. They are effective because they draw upon the expertise of
private actors to supply regulatory solutions that are especially important to
private actors.
F. International Financial Architecture as Work-in-Progress
I make four observations about the international financial architecture.
First, the vast majority of international regulatory activity takes place through
networks of regulators and market participants, meeting on a regular basis in
organized forums. In these forums, they develop rules and standards that
participating members then implement at home. The most important networks
are transgovernmental networks because of the number of regulators that
participate in the networks, the breadth of issues these networks address and the
willingness of participating and non-participating regulators to carry out the
networks' recommendations.
Second, while transgovernmental networks have been critical in producing
financial regulation, they do not actually regulate the international financial
system. Transgovernmental networks are inherently passive entities. They
87

Membership includes the majority of the world's major institutions that deal in privately
negotiated derivatives, in addition to many businesses, governmental entities and other end users
of over-the-counter derivatives. Members are classified as primary (dealer firms), associate (service
providers), and subscriber (end-users). See International Swaps and Derivatives Association
("ISDA'D, About ISDA, online at http://www.isda.org/ (visited Mar 22, 2010); ISDA, FA.Qs in
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online at http://www.isda.org/media/pdf/resourcesfaqs.pdf (visited Mar 22, 2010).
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ISDA, Opinions and Legislation, online at http://www.isda.org/ (visited Mar 22, 2010). The ISDA
Master Agreement incorporates counterparty risk mitigation practices such as netting, allows for
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function by waiting for consensus to develop concerning the convergence or
harmonization of rules and standards. With small or even non-existent
secretariats, these networks do not have the resources, technical competence or
authority to initiate actions unless they have the strong support of the most
significant parties. The decision to pursue new regulation often takes place at the
behest of states that make their desires known through political agreements
brokered at state-to-state contact groups. The G-groups have been integral in
the establishment of several transgovernmental networks and directed most of
the major initiatives of the Basel Committee and FSF/FSB. Transgovernmental
networks' main contribution to the international financial architecture, which is
by no means insignificant, is to pool together technical expertise, ensure the
sharing of information and provide a framework for regulatory cooperation
when the political will appears.
Third, given their limitations, transgovernmental networks cannot assist in
one of the most pressing problems of financial regulation: the supervision of
financial institutions. Transgovernmental networks can only provide support to
national supervisors by suggesting supervisory standards and issuing technical
guidance. The actual responsibility for supervision stays with the national
regulators.
Finally, crisis management remains entirely in the hands of state-to-state
contact groups. Only the G-groups have the ability to demand action as their
power stems from the ability of political leaders to recognize an immediate
problem and marshal their combined national law making authority to prepare a
response. But the G-groups offer only ad hoc assistance in the regulation of the
financial markets. Like cartoon superheroes, the G-groups are crime fighters,
stepping in to restore law and order only after the villain has begun wrecking
havoc on the city, but they are not crime preventers. The task of protecting the
safety and soundness of the financial system is the responsibility of the national
prudential supervisors and systemic risk regulators. This is an uncertain
condition for the international financial system.
III. THE PROBLEM OF SUPERVISION
A. Supervision as a Distinctive Form of Regulation
International law scholars who analyze the performance of
transgovernmental networks should distinguish between rulemaking and
standards setting, on the one hand, and supervision, on the other. This
distinction is important because one of the main achievements of
transgovernmental networks has been to drive convergence and harmonization
of national rules and standards in the areas of banking, securities, and insurance.
Basel I and Basel II, for example, are successful instances where a
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transgovernmental network has been able to produce a broadly accepted set of
regulatory standards. The recent financial crisis, however, demonstrated that the
real need for regulatory action is in the area of supervision.
The financial crisis stemmed from a series of governance and operational
failures at various financial institutions: a breakdown in underwriting standards
for subprime mortgages; erosion of market discipline by parties involved in the
mortgage securitization process; flaws in credit rating agencies' assessments of
subprime mortgages; risk management weaknesses at large financial institutions;
and failure by financial institutions to mitigate these risk management
weaknesses." Avoiding such failures in the future requires regulators to focus
more intensely on the supervision of large financial institutions.92
Supervision is very different from rulemaking and standards setting."
Common rules and standards pertaining to financial institutions include capital
requirements, disclosure and reporting obligations, and consumer protection
rules. Supervision, on the other hand, is the process by which regulators monitor
the behavior of financial institutions and service-providers to ensure, at a
minimum, that such actors adhere to applicable rules and standards and to
evaluate the soundness of such institutions' management practices with regard to
91

92

93

The President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Policy Statement on Financial Market
online
at
https://treas.gov/press/releases/reports/
Developments
(Mar
2008),
pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf (visited Mar 15, 2010). See also HM Treasury, Reforming
Financial Markets 1, 35 (July 2009), online at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/
reforming-financial markets080709.pdf (visited Mar 15, 2010). Weakness of risk management is
also a failure of corporate governance and the disinterested nature of boards of directors toward
the management of non-legal risk. See Eric J. Pan, A Board's Duty to Monitor, 54 NY L Sch L Rev
719 (2010).
See Nout Wellink, Beyond the Crisis: the Basel Committee's Strategic Response, 13 Banque de France
Financial Stability Review 123, 124 (Sept 2009), online at http://www.banquefrance.fr/gb/publications/telechar/rsf/2009/etudel3_rsf_0909.pdf (visited Mar 15, 2010) ("The
financial crisis has exposed many examples where bankers have strayed from the basic principles
of sound risk management and underwriting practices and where supervisors did not sufficiently
probe and follow-up on these weaknesses.").
See Rosa M. Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe, 10
Colum J Eur L 49 (2003) (noting that the terms "regulation" and "supervision" are often used
interchangeably despite the fact they represent different concepts); Cynthia Crawford
Lichtenstein, The Fed's New Model of Supervisionfor 'Lage Complex Banking OrganiZations":Coordinated
Risk-Based Supervision of FinancialMultinationalsfor InternationalFinancialStabiiy, 18 Transnatl Law
283, 287-88 (2005) (discussing the difference between rulemaking and supervision); Andrew
Crockett, Gen Manager of the Bank for Intl Settlements, Banking Supervision and Regulation:
InternationalTrends, Remarks at the 64th Banking Convention of the Mex Bankers' Assn (Mar 30,
2001), online at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp010330.htm (visited Mar 16, 2010) ("[O]ne of
the important trends has been, and continues to be, a move away from regulation, and towards
supervision-a move, in other words, away from compliance with portfolio constraints, and
toward an assessment of whether the overall management of a financial firm's business is being
prudently conducted.").
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controlling risk. Without supervision, rules and standards lose meaning.9 4
Historically, regulators approached the task of supervision in a passive manner,
conducting examinations and inspections on a periodic basis and without deep
involvement in the internal operations of the financial institution."
As the financial markets have grown more complex, regulators have had to
devote more resources to supervision." Financial innovation now makes it too
easy for financial institutions to incur large trading losses in very short time (as
the recent financial crisis painfully illustrated)." As a result, periodic
examinations of financial institutions by regulators to check on compliance with
generalized rules and standards are insufficient to prevent financial institutions
from assuming excessive risk.98 Instead, prudential supervision must consist of
more intensive (and intrusive) oversight of financial institutions by regulators.
Regulators must devote more resources to evaluating the quality of a financial
institution's assets and assessing banks' internal models and the soundness of
financial institutions' risk management practices." Such evaluation depends less
on the regulator's interpretation of applicable rules and standards and more on
her understanding of the financial institution and her ability and willingness to
exercise independent judgment in evaluating the financial institution's
operations." Rules and standards, such as capital adequacy requirements or
94

Key, 75 Intl Affairs at 69 (cited in note 23).

9s

See, for example, Lisa M. DeFerrari and David E. Palmer, Superision of Large Complex Banking
OrganiZaions, 87 Fed Res Bull 47, 48 (Feb 2001) (describing the Federal Reserve's historical
practice of limited and periodic supervision of banks and bank holding companies).

96

See Frederic S. Mishkin, Prudential Supervision: Why Is It Important and What Are the Issues?,
in Frederic S. Mishkin, ed, Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't 1, 13-14
(Chicago 2001).

97

See id at 14.

99

See id; DeFerrari and Palmer, 87 Fed Res Bull at 49-51 (cited in note 95) (describing the Federal
Reserve's developing Large Complex Banking Organizations supervision program).

99

One of the implications is that the requirements for supervisors will be more demanding:
Supervisors have to understand all aspects of a financial firm's business, and to
foresee the multiple sources of risk it is likely to confront. This means that
supervision is becoming a more demanding profession, and the skills required
of supervisors are becoming greater and more diverse. Accounting and legal
training, while important, are no longer enough. Supervisory authorities are
going have to seek also staff with backgrounds in economics and business
management. Supervisors are becoming more like consultants, whose task is to
understand the bank's business and draw management's attention to
underappreciated sources of risk.
Crockett, Remarks (cited in note 93).

100

It is important to recognize that financial supervisors play a different role than prosecutors or
other enforcement agents. If a financial institution is found to be not in compliance with relevant
rules or standards, the supervisor often has the authority to take a variety of formal or informal
actions to steer the financial institution toward safer practice. Prudential supervisors are not
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reporting obligations, may be drafted to limit or deter risk-taking by financial
institutions. By contrast, supervision relies to a greater extent on the ability and
willingness of regulators to investigate and question the internal decision-making
and risk management processes of financial institutions even in the absence of a
clear violation of a rule or standard."o' Furthermore, the new approach to
supervision also requires a level of expertise and performance by the supervisor
that may not be easily translated into broad supervisory standards.' 0 2
The proposed regulatory responses of the leading financial economies to
the recent financial crisis confirm their belief that the causes of the recent
financial crisis demand more intensive supervisory oversight of financial
institutions. The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA),'s for example, recently
announced its new "Supervisory Enhancement Programme" (SEP). 04 The FSA
initially developed the SEP to improve its previous strategy of passive regulation
and market self-discipline to ensure the safety and soundness of financial
institutions. Instead, the FSA has proposed a strategy of review and secondguessing, consisting of FSA supervisors questioning, and in some cases
overruling, the decisions of senior management of financial institutions. 0s The
SEP emphasizes FSA personnel exercising independent judgment of future
risks. In practice, the SEP would include "mystery shopping and branch
visits,"1o' "dedicated supervisors on each major firm,"'0 7 "a compulsory and
irreducible programme of regular meetings with the senior management," 0 8
vetting new candidates for positions of significant influence in financial
always in an adversarial relationship with the financial institutions and often share common
interest with those entities they regulate.
101 Former Federal Reserve Governor Laurence Meyer in 2000 already sounded the alarm concerning

102

the diminishing relevance of capital adequacy rules because of financial innovation. See Laurence
H. Meyer, Supenising Large Complex Banking OrganiZations: Adaping to Change, in Frederic S.
Mishkin, ed, PrudentialSupenision: What Works and What Doesn't 97, 97-98 (Chicago 2001).
See DeFerrari and Palmer, 87 Fed Res Bull at 53 (cited in note 95).

103

The UK has a single regulator to supervise and regulate its entire financial system. In the future,
the UK may divide supervisory responsibility between the FSA and the Bank of England. See
Pan, Four Challenges of FinandalRegulation at 6 (cited in note 10).

104

See Financial Services Authority, A Regulatog Response to the GlobalBanking Crisis, Discussion Paper
at
online
2009),
(March
183-96
at
Approach
11
Supervisory
§
09/2,
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp09-02.pdf (visited Mar 15, 2010).
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See id, 1 11.14 ("In the future the FSA's supervisors will seek to make judgments on the
judgments of senior management and take action if in their view those actions will lead to risks to
the FSA's statutory objectives. This is a fundamental change. It is effectively moving from
regulation based on facts to regulation based on judgments about the future.")

106

Id,

107

Id, T 11.24.

108

FSA, A RegulatoU Response at 190, Box 11.1.

11.22.
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institutions,'" and "greater focus on testing outcomes as well as the firms'

systems and controls.""o This approach relies heavily on the judgment and
discretion of the supervisors.
It is useful to note how the FSA conceives of its role as supervisor to be
distinct from the rulemaking and standard-setting work it conducts within the
international financial architecture. In terms of the development of standards,
the FSA is a participant in a multinational process. "The FSA designs policy in
partnership globally with international bodies [transgovernmental networks],
other regulators [bilateral and regional networks], central banks and finance
ministers.""' Further, the development of common supervisory standards is an
important part of the work the FSA handles at the international level. In fact, a
key part of the SEP is the benchmarking of the FSA's supervisory approach with
the supervisory approaches of other countries, especially those of Canada, Spain,
and the US.11 2 On the other hand, the FSA makes clear that the international
legal frameworks do not extend to supervision: "On policy formulation, the FSA
is a participant in the process . . . . The FSA is, however, responsible for

delivering effective supervision and recognizes that it is fully accountable for that
delivery."13

While US regulators have been less specific than the UK about how they
will modify their regulatory approach to respond to the recent financial crisis,
the few statements that have been made to date echo the FSA's proposal to
emphasize supervision over rulemaking and standards setting. For example, the
US Treasury Department's White Paper on Financial Regulatory Reform (US
Treasury White Paper), recommends "a more robust consolidated supervisory
regime" for any firm whose combination of size, leverage, and
interconnectedness could pose a threat to financial stability if it failed." 4 While
the proposed supervisory improvements are set forth in the form of supervisory
standards, the nature of the standards are such that they will be applied
differently to each financial institution and therefore depend heavily on the
judgment and discretion of the supervisory authority. For example, the new
supervisory regime will demand that the risk management practices of the target
financial institution be in proportion to the risk, complexity, and scope of its
1o9

See generally id (cited in note 104).

110

See id at 190, Box 11.1.

"I See id,T11.8.
112 FSA, A Regulatory Response,
13
114

11.25.

Id, $1 11.8, 11.9 (cited in note 104).
The US Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform A New Foundadon: Rebuilding
Financial Supendsion and Regulation ('Treasuy White Paper') 1, 22 (June 2009), online at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf (visited Mar 15, 2010).
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operations."' The US Treasury White Paper specifically notes that the Fed and
other supervisory authorities will determine how to conduct continuous, on-site
supervision of banking firms, what regular information supervisors must obtain
from firms, and the extent to which supervision of smaller, simpler banking
firms should differ from supervision of larger, more complex firms."'
B. The Struggle to Supervise Cross-Border Financial
Institutions
Both the FSA and the Treasury Department's proposals concerning
supervision highlight two challenges for the international financial architecture.
First, to what extent will the international financial architecture be able to
participate in the supervision of cross-border financial institutions? Second, how
should the international financial architecture structure the relationship between
national supervisors? In both cases, the most important member of the
international financial architecture pertaining to banking regulation and
supervision is the Basel Committee (Basel).
The first challenge goes to the heart of Basel's capacity to carry out
financial supervision. As a transgovernmental network, Basel cannot engage
directly in the supervision of cross-border financial institutions. The actual task
of supervision is vested in the national supervisory authorities. Instead, the role
of Basel is to facilitate cooperation among its members by exchanging
information on national supervisory issues and approaches, with a view of
promoting common understanding. In 1996, the G7 urged Basel to promulgate
a set of standards for banking supervision-another example of regulatory
convergence taking place as a result of a political agreement by a state-to-state
contact group."'8 In 1997, Basel produced the Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision (Core Principles), which it revised in 2006."' The Core
115

See id at 25.

116

See id at 29.

117

In addition, the Basel Committee works with IOSCO and IAIS in the joint Forum on Financial
Conglomerates to promulgate regulatory standards for financial institutions that provide services
across banking, securities, and insurance lines, offering a good example of how transgovernmental
networks also form networks with each other.

118

See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Prinnplesfor Effective Banking Supendsion 1 (Sept
1997), online at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdPnoframes=1 (visited Mar 15, 2010).

119

See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Princalesfor Effective Banking Supendsion 1 (Oct
2006), online at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl29.pdf (visited May 3, 2010). Basel has also
issued guidance with IOSCO and IAIS on the supervision of financial conglomerates. See Joint
Forum on Financial Conglomerates, Supenrision of Finandal Conglomerates (Feb 1999), online at
table_of_content
http://www.iaisweb.org/_temp/Supervisionof FinancialConglomerates
s and-intro.pdf (visited Mar 15, 2010).
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Principles consist of twenty-five principles that Basel believes all member states
should implement to have effective supervisory systems. 120 What is striking
about the Core Principles, especially when viewed in the context of the recent
financial crisis, is how distant the standards are from the actual task of
supervising a financial institution. The Core Principles are broad and vague.
They offer little direct guidance on how supervisors should evaluate risk
management and internal control systems or monitor senior management,
especially when overseeing complex, global banks (and financial institutions).
For example, Principle 15 suggests that "supervisors must be satisfied that banks
have in place risk management policies and processes to identify, assess,
monitor, and control/mitigate operational risk and that these policies and
processes should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the bank." 12 1
Implementing this principle effectively in an international realm, however,
depends on each national authority's interpretation and ability to coordinate its
own efforts with those of other countries.
Basel does wield a great deal of influence over supervision indirectly
through its formulation of capital adequacy standards. More stringent capital
adequacy requirements can be a substitute for additional supervision. Through
Basel II, the Basel Committee lays down very specific requirements for the
capital that banks must maintain. These requirements, in turn, constrain the
ability of banks to take on risk.122 Consider, for example, two consultative
documents put forward by Basel in December 2009 proposing reforms to bank
capital and liquidity regulation.123 The first document, "capital proposals,"
revised the definition of capital, raising the quality, consistency, and transparency
of the capital base, with the goal of ensuring that the banking system is in a
better position to absorb losses on both a going concern and a gone concern
basis. These proposals tightened and simplified the definition of the so-called
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to prevent banks from counting certain higher risk
assets as part of their capital reserve and require banks to change how they
measure risk when calculating existing capital.124 The second document,
120

See the Basel Committee, Core Princaples at 2-5 (Oct 2006) (cited in note 119).

121

Id at 4.
See Joilo A. C. Santos, Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of
the Literature, 10 Fin Markets Institutions & Instruments 41 (2001).
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector consultative
Consultative Document (Dec 2009), online at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl64.pdenoframes=l
(visited Mar 15, 2010); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Framework for
Iequidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring Consultative Document (Dec 2009), online at
http://www.bis.org/pubi/bcbsl65.pdnoframes=1 (visited Mar 15, 2010).
See Basel Committee, Strengthening the ResiAence of the Banking Sector at 23 (cited in note 123). When
the Basel Committee adopted Basel II, it expressly chose not to address or change the
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"liquidity proposals," introduced a prescribed leverage ratio, which will help
contain the build-up of excessive leverage in the banking system. These
proposals mandate that all internationally active banks comply with a minimum
liquidity coverage ratio and a net stable funding ratio. 2511n addition, banks must
make reports to their supervisors using a standard set of metrics.12 6 This
standardization of reporting information is meant to help supervisors better
understand banks' risk profiles. 2 7 While these proposals will facilitate
supervision of financial institutions, they still do not remove from regulators the
ultimate responsibility of exercising oversight.
Given that Basel cannot directly supervise cross-border financial
institutions, the second challenge it faces is helping to coordinate supervision
among national regulators. Cross-border financial institutions pose a particularly
difficult challenge to national financial supervisors. Cross-border financial
institutions operate in multiple jurisdictions, and they can easily shift assets and
liabilities between these jurisdictions. Individual national supervisors naturally
struggle to monitor financial institutions' operations across jurisdictions. The
Basel Concordat attempted to solve this problem by setting forth the principle
of consolidated home country supervision.128 According to this principle, the
primary responsibility for the supervision of a cross-border financial institution
lies with the financial institution's home regulator.129 Host regulators rely on that
home regulator to ensure the safety and soundness of the entire financial
institution. The principle of consolidated home country supervision also serves
to reduce barriers to financial institutions seeking to expand into new
jurisdictions as the institution is subject to oversight and regulation by only one
supervisor.

components of capital, reserving that task for a later date. The "capital proposals" now do that,
with the most significant changes to Tier 1 Capital, now predominantly in the form of common
shares and retained earnings. See H. Rodgin Cohen, Basel Committee Proposes Strengthening Bank
Capital and Liquidity Regulation, Harvard L Sch Forum (Jan 7, 2010), online at
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/01/07/basel-committee-proposes-strengtheningbank-capital-and-liquidity-regulation/ (visited Mar 15, 2010).
125 A minimum liquidity coverage ratio requires an adequate amount of high-quality assets that can be
converted into cash to cover a bank's liquidity needs for 30 days. A net stable funding ratio
requires adequate medium- and long-term funding assets to cover a bank's long-term obligations.
forL.iquidit at 2-3 (cited in note 123).
See Basel Committee, InternationalFramework
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Bank for International Settlements Press Release, Consultative Proposals to Strengthen the Resilience of
the Banking Sector Announced by the Basel Committee (Dec 17, 2009), online at
http://www.bis.org/press/p091217.htm (visited Mar 15, 2010).
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Id.
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Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Pinclesfor the Superrition ofBanks' ForignEstablishments
1, 4 (May 1983), online at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc312.pdf (visited Mar 15, 2010).
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The principle of consolidated home country supervision conflicts with
national supervisors' inclination to protect their home markets first.
Consequently, there is the risk that home supervisors may make supervisory
decisions designed to protect customers, depositors, and counterparties in their
home market at the expense of those parties located in foreign markets.' 30
During times of crisis, the division of supervisory responsibilities among
national supervisors becomes increasingly unstable as host supervisors begin to
doubt the effectiveness of the home country supervisor. For instance, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority (IFSA) had responsibility for
supervising the consolidated operations of Icelandic banks and their branches in
foreign countries immediately before the recent financial crisis. Regulators in
host jurisdictions relied on the IFSA, as home country supervisor, to monitor
the soundness of these banks. When it became known that several large
Icelandic banks were close to failure, the host jurisdictions, particularly the UK,
demanded a role in overseeing the operations of the Icelandic banks in their
respective countries and questioned the competency of the IFSA in continuing
to serve as the consolidated supervisor.13 ' Since the Iceland incident, the FSA

130

131

Implicit in the principle of home country supervision is the notion that a bank's capital will be
transferred between jurisdictions as necessary to meet local demands. During the recent financial
crisis, however, concerns about multi-jurisdictional demands on a failing bank's dwindling assets
incited host regulators to freeze assets to ensure sufficient capital remains to pay off local
obligations. See, for example, HM Treasury Press Release, Landsbanki, Heritable, and Kaupthing
Singer and Friedlander(Oct 9, 2008), online at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_103_08.htm
(visited Mar 15, 2010). Such acts undermine the home country regulator's ability to offer credible
supervision of the bank.
UK officials have expressed concern with the principle of home country supervision after the
collapse of several Icelandic banks put at risk billions of pounds of deposits made by UK
residents. See, for example, Verena Ross, FSA Director of Strategy and Risk, Speech at the
Chatham House Conference on Global Financial Regulation, Lessonsfrom the Financial Crisis (Mar
online
at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/
24,
2009),
2009/0324 vr.shtm (visited Mar 15, 2010):
The failure of the Icelandic banks has demonstrated that current
arrangements, and in particular the current home/host framework of sharing
supervisory responsibility are unsustainable. As a reminder, the current
arrangements combine branch passporting rights, home country supervision
and purely home-country based deposit insurance. This setup, using the
Icelandic banking crisis as an example meant that Landsbanki was free to
operate in the UK as a branch over which the FSA only had limited powers, as
responsibility for its prudential supervision rested with the Icelandic regulator.
UK depositors were also later dependent on the Icelandic deposit insurance
scheme, with resources that proved inadequate and requiring the intervention
of the UK authorities.
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has called for host country supervisors to play a more significant role in
supervising local branches of foreign financial institutions.'3 2
Basel attempts to solve the problem of cross-border supervision by
converging or harmonizing national supervisory standards into international
standards such as the Core Principles and Basel II, and introducing the concept
of home country supervision to eliminate supervisory gaps. The recent financial
crisis showed that this approach was not entirely effective. A stronger
international law regime is needed to avoid previous supervisory failures.
IV. AN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW MODEL FOR
CROSS-BORDER SUPERVISION
A. An International Administrative Law Agency
An international law regime must address four issues. First, it needs to
promote cooperation and information sharing between national supervisors,
especially during times of impending financial crises when a national supervisor
may be reluctant to share information that reveals its mistakes or poor
performance. Second, it must address differences in supervisory powers between
national supervisors. Third, it must secure sufficient resources to perform the
technical work required of a financial supervisor. Fourth, to the extent it relies
on national supervisors to carry out the decisions made at the international level,
the regime needs a means to make decisions that have the support of all of its
members.
To this end, one proposal to improve cooperation by national supervisors
is to replace consolidated home country supervision with a college of
supervisors.'3 3 The college would consist of representatives of each host country
regulator with a lead role reserved for the home country regulator. The success
of such an arrangement depends on the willingness of national supervisors to
share information with each other, the efficiency of decision-making, and the
ability to enforce implementation of college decisions. Past attempts at having a
college of supervisors oversee multi-jurisdictional financial institutions have had
mixed results, and ironically the push to strengthen home country supervision
stemmed from the perceived failures of one such college of supervisors.134 Thus,
132 See UK Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatoy Response to the Global Finandal
Crisis 100-01 (Mar 2009), online at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner-review.pdf
(visited Mar 15, 2010).
133 See id at 97-99 (endorsing the Financial Stability Forum's proposal for colleges of supervisors to
regulate cross-border financial institutions).
134 Bank of Credits and Commerce International ("BCCI") was overseen by a college of supervisors,
consisting of representatives from several countries in which BCCI operated, including the UK,
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there are reasons to be skeptical that colleges of supervisors will generate the
level of cooperation needed to effectively oversee large, cross-border financial
institutions.
The proposal for a college of supervisors is really an expression of a desire
to combine the supervisory power of national regulators with the multijurisdictional perspective of an international legal regime. If we were to pursue
this desire to the furthest extent, the better approach would be to concentrate
supervisory authority in an international body. This international body-rising
above the jurisdictional limitations of national supervisors and equipped with the
necessary information gathering and oversight powers needed of a prudential
supervisor-would assume responsibility for supervising cross-border financial
institutions. The reason for its development echoes those reasons that drove the
emergence of transgovernmental networks: the globalization of financial markets
and financial services providers has rendered the tools and methods of domestic
supervisors (and by extension those of transgovernmental networks) inadequate
to handle the supervision of cross-border financial institutions.' 35
Such a legal "body"-as opposed to a network-would be a new addition
to the international financial architecture. If one were to imagine such a body, it
would have five essential attributes that would make it more capable than a
transgovernmental network. First, it must have operational independence from
states. From such independence, the body gains the ability to initiate regulatory
action. The effectiveness of this body depends on its ability to pursue a
regulatory agenda that does not rely on key states first recognizing a problem
and then choosing to propose a possible solution in an international forum.
Such a process makes transgovernmental networks inherently reactive where
action takes place primarily by virtue of state pressure. The ability to initiate
action is essential for such a body to play any significant role in supervising
financial institutions. Another aspect of independence from states is the ability

Pakistan, Luxembourg, and the Cayman Islands. The Basel Committee faulted the college for
absence of leadership and problems in coordination and communication between regulators
about BCCI's international operations, and proposed new standards that emphasized the role of
the home country to provide consolidated supervision. See Basel Committee on Banking

Supervision, Minimum Standardsfor the Supenision of InternationalBanking Groups and Their Cross-Border

135

Establishment 3-7 (July 1992), online at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc314.pdf (visited Mar 15,
2010). In 1997, the Basel Committee published the "Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision," which provided more guidance on the supervision of multi-jurisdictional bank
holding companies. The home country supervisor of the bank parent is responsible for
monitoring the risk exposure and capital adequacy of the bank group. See Basel Committee, Core
Principles(Sept 1997) at 40-41 (cited in note 118).
See Slaughter, A New World Order at 8-11 (cited in note 4). See also Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl L at
12-13 (cited in note 4) (citing "technological innovation," "the rise of the regulatory state," and
"globalization" as the root cause of the "rise of networks.").
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to make decisions. While states will be members of such an international body
and state support for the body is a fundamental requirement for the body's
authority and legitimacy, the body must have in place a decision-making process
by which decisions can be made based upon less than unanimous support of
states and where disagreements between states can be settled in a definitive
manner.
Second, the body must be expert. In order to regulate financial institutions,
the body must have the ability to learn, retain, and apply detailed knowledge of
the operations of financial institutions and the markets in which they do
business. Third, the body must have enforcement powers. It must have the
means to enforce its supervisory directives as they are applied to financial
institutions. In addition, it must have the ability to ensure that national regulators
implement the body's decisions. Fourth, the body must have sufficient
resources. The body must have a sizeable budget and a permanent staff. The
possession of such resources is essential for the body to develop regulatory
expertise and to initiate regulatory action. Fifth, the body must have a range of
formal and informal regulatory tools at its disposal. Formal and informal tools
are essential to the problem of supervision where the role of the supervisor is
not to punish or sanction a financial institution but to ensure the financial
institution operates in a sound and safe manner. Furthermore, the body must
possess flexibility to identify and respond to supervisory problems in light of
changing market conditions and continued financial innovation.
The body would share some of the characteristics of an international
organization-a secretariat and sizeable permanent staff, independent resources
and decision-making authority. It would also share some of the characteristics of
many transgovernmental networks-technical and regulatory expertise derived
from the hosting of frequent meetings between state and private regulators. For
American lawyers, it is hard not to notice similarities between such a body and
an administrative agency, especially with respect to its expertise, independence,
and flexibility. In fact, one is reminded of James Landis' observation: "The
administrative process is, in essence, our generation's answer to the inadequacy
of the judicial and the legislative processes."' 36 The sentiment behind his
statement should be updated to reflect today's reality of global markets and
powerful non-state actors: the international administrative process is, in essence,
this generation's answer to the inadequacy of international organizations and
transgovernmental networks that form the current international financial
architecture.
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James Landis, The Administraive Process, excerpted in Peter H. Schuck, Foundaions ofAdministradve
Law 14 (Foundation Press 2d ed 2004).
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In proposing an international administrative law model for cross-border
supervision, some international law scholars argue that there already exists a
framework for an international administrative law regime. Benedict Kingsbury
and Richard Stewart, for example, describe the current international financial
architecture as one part of an administrative state.'17 Administrative and
regulatory functions traditionally carried out by state actors are now being
carried out at the international level "through a great number of different forms,
ranging from binding decisions of international organizations to nonbinding
agreements in intergovernmental networks and to domestic administrative action
in the context of global regimes."' 8 Through these forms "we can observe ...
the exercise of recognizably administrative and regulatory functions: the setting
and application of rules by bodies that are not legislative or primarily
adjudicative in character."' 39
The recognition of the existence of these international legal networks by
itself does not mean that there should be an international administrative law
regime or that such an administrative law regime is sustainable. The legal basis
for an international administrative law body, as described above, stems from the
belief that an administrative space exists in international law.14 0 An international
legal body with administrative powers would occupy this space.
In referencing the work of Kingsbury and Stewart, it is helpful to note that
they focus on describing the administrative nature of the international financial
14
architecture as a whole, which they refer to as "global administrative law." '
137

See Nico Krisch and Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and GlobalAdministrative
Law in the International Legal Order, 17 Eur J Intl L 1, 2 (2006). See also Richard B. Stewart and
Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The World Trade Organization and Global Administrative Law,
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The idea of a "global administrative space" differs from those orthodox
understandings of international law in which the international is largely intergovernmental, and there is a reasonably sharp separation of the domestic and
the international. In the practice of global governance, transnational networks
of rule-generators, interpreters and appliers cause such strict barriers to break
down.
141 The term "Global Administrative Law" is used, as opposed to "International Administrative
Law," in order "to reflect the enmeshment of domestic and international regulation, the inclusion
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This Article, on the other hand, insists on the term "international administrative
law" to describe the more specific problem of an international body with certain
administrative powers.
At first glance, the international administrative law model appears to
challenge the traditional conception of international law where law is made
entirely through inter-governmental processes.142 In her early work describing
transgovernmental networks, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter suggested that
transgovernmental networks marked the decline of liberal internationalism and
the rise of an international legal regime dominated by supra-state and non-state
actors.14 3 But to depict an international administrative body as a state's rival
ignores the fact that such a body would exist to provide states with a means of
protecting their interests-in this case, their interest in ensuring a safe and sound
financial system, protecting depositors, and maintaining liquidity-that would
otherwise be beyond their control. Furthermore, the objects of regulation are
entities that are themselves rivals to states-that is, multinational financial
institutions. Thus, an international administrative law regime is quite consistent
with liberal internationalism.
B. Case Study: European System of Financial Supervisors
One model for such an international legal body is the European System of
Financial Supervisors (ESFS). The ESFS is a new European body tasked with
coordinating and overseeing the supervision of cross-border financial
institutions in the EU. In November 2008, the European Commission
established an expert panel chaired by Jacques de Larosiere, a senior official of
the French Treasury, to study possible reforms of the EU financial regulatory
system.1" The panel's mandate was to study the causes of the recent financial
crisis, identify weaknesses in Europe's supervision of its financial institutions,

of a large array of informal institutional arrangements (many involving prominent roles for nonstate actors), and the foundation of the field in normative practices, and normative sources, that
are not fully encompassed within standard conceptions of international law." Krisch and
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and recommend improvements to the EU supervisory system.14 s The de
Larosiere Report recommended the creation of two new European bodies, a
European Systemic Risk Council (later renamed the European Systemic Risk
Board) to monitor systemic risk events and the ESFS.146 The European
Commission endorsed the de Larosiere Report in March 2009,147 proposing in
September 2009 legislation to establish the ESFS.148
The ESFS consists of a small steering committee and three European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs): the European Banking Authority, European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, and European Securities and
Markets Authority. 14 9 Each ESA in turn consists of a committee of
representatives from the various national regulators and a permanent staff. The
de Larosiere Report recognized that national regulators are better able to effect
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European Recovey,
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the day-to-day supervision of European financial institutions given their closer
position to the markets and institutions they supervise.150 Consequently, the
ESFS expects national regulators to have primary responsibility for the
supervision of European financial institutions. But unlike a transgovernmental
network, the ESFS's function is more than just to serve as a forum for
coordinating initiatives of national regulators or promoting regulatory
convergence and harmonization. Rather, the de Larosiere Report recommended
that EU member states vest with the ESFS certain powers and resources that
would allow the ESFS to take a more proactive role in directing the supervision
of European financial institutions."' In this respect, the ESFS represents a step
toward an international administrative law body.
The powers and resources of the ESFS fall into five categories. First, the
de Larosiere Report recommended that the ESFS be given a larger budget and
the ability to hire a permanent staff.'5 2 Significantly, its budget would be funded
from either the financial industry or public sector contributions, implying that
53
the ESFS would have the power to levy fees on financial institutions.' Such
resources would enable the ESFS to have greater capacity to conduct
supervisory activities on its own.
Second, the de Larosirre Report recommended that the ESFS be given the
power to participate directly in the supervision of certain financial institutions.
Specifically, the ESFS would be empowered to have representation in any
college of supervisors. This would allow the ESFS to participate alongside
national regulators to monitor their performance, to aggregate all relevant
information pertaining to financial institutions, and to take part in on-site
inspections carried out by national regulators.154 It is expected that supervisory
colleges would be established for all major cross-border financial institutions in
the EU."' In addition, the ESFS would be entirely responsible for licensing and
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supervising certain EU-wide institutions such as credit rating agencies and
central counterparty clearing houses."'
Third, the ESFS would have the power to issue decisions and promulgate
supervisory standards. Significantly, decisions of the ESAs would be made by
qualified majority vote instead of by consensus, and such decisions would be
binding on all member states.1 7 Furthermore, the ESFS would have the power
to make authoritative interpretations of framework legislation and implementing
measures decided by the European Council, Parliament, and Commission.'
This power of authoritative interpretation provides the ESFS with unusual
flexibility to define its own powers and the scope of EU legislation.5"' The
rulemaking powers of the ESFS are even greater and more immediate if there is
a financial crisis. 6 o
Fourth, the ESFS would have the power to resolve disputes between its
members. After an attempt to resolve a disagreement through a conciliation
process, each ESA may issue a decision to settle a dispute, and such decision
shall be binding on all parties.
Fifth, the de Larosiere Report recommended that the ESFS have broad
powers of surveillance, monitoring, and implementation. Its powers consist of:
managing a peer review process where national regulators review the quality of
each other's supervisory systems; collecting and aggregating information from
national regulators concerning specific financial institutions; verifying the
reliability of information shared between national regulators during crisis
situations; and challenging the performance of any national regulator and issuing
rulings to ensure the national regulator corrects all identified weaknesses.
The European Commission accepted the recommendations of the de
Larosi~re Report because it recognized that "[n]ationally-based supervisory
models have lagged behind the integrated and interconnected reality of today's
European financial markets, in which many financial firms operate across
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borders."162 To ameliorate this problem, the European Commission has
accepted that a new body is needed that would have powers enabling it to force
coordination of supervision even in the face of disagreement from a minority of
EU member states. Furthermore, the European Commission acknowledged that
in order for the ESFS to be an effective European-level supervisor it had to be
independent.'63 The ESFS's independence is partially safeguarded by its ability to
raise its own funds hire permanent staff. But the Commission also reiterated the
importance of the ESFS to be free of political pressure from member states.
Admittedly, the ESFS is a special case. The EU offers a unique legal
environment for the development of such an administrative law body. Many of
the powers of the ESFS, especially powers to issue binding decisions by qualified
majority vote or settlement of disputes between members, derive from the
obligations member states have assumed under the Treaty on EU. Furthermore,
the EU member states share an unusually strong desire to cooperate given the
EU's long history of striving to establish the free movement of goods and
services in a single European market. Therefore, it is understandable for some to
believe it unlikely that the ESFS could be replicated outside of the EU.
Nonetheless, if successful, the ESFS would represent the most advanced
international financial regulator in the global financial system. By its very
existence, the ESFS offers a sharp contrast to existing legal frameworks in the
international financial architecture and should be seen as a positive experiment
in international administrative law.
C. Accountability and Legitimacy of an International
Administrative Law Body
A common criticism of transgovernmental networks and global
administrative law is that they lack accountability and legitimacy.164 Traditionally,
legitimacy of international norms arises from the consensual nature of
65
international law-international rules apply only if there is state consent.1
Transgovernmental networks undermine this process of legitimatization in two
ways. First, the participants in the networks are generally sub-state actors who
themselves may not be directly accountable to the public at home. Second, when
162
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transgovernmental networks generate a strong norm for states to implement any
decisions made at the international level into domestic law, then states can no
longer rely on procedural and judicial protections at home to ensure there is
domestic accountability and legitimacy.
Defenders of transgovernmental networks, however, argue that
transgovernmental networks have responded to concerns of accountability and
legitimacy by adopting a variety of procedural protections. Barr, Miller and
Zaring for example, have written about the efforts of Basel to make its decisionmaking process more transparent and open to public scrutiny.16 6 They each note
that Basel has adopted a notice and comment procedure for consultative
documents.'67 IOSCO also seeks public comments on new proposals and
frequently holds public meetings, encouraging the attendance of private groups.
The only procedural protection that transgovernmental networks do not offer is
judicial or administrative review, but such protection remains available in the
domestic sphere.
The problem of accountability and legitimacy is even greater in the case of
an international administrative law body, especially one focused on prudential
supervision. One concern is the additional power of such a body relative to a
transgovernmental network. States that have committed themselves to
supporting such a body would be bound by its decisions with less opportunity to
register disagreement. The other concern is that common procedural protections
such as notice-and-comment and transparency are less helpful in the case of
supervision. Notice-and-comment and transparency are of greatest benefit in
rulemaking and standards setting. Supervision, on the other hand, offers less
opportunity for public debate and deliberation. Given that supervisors ideally
must respond decisively to fleeting market and institutional conditions, we must
trust our supervisors to act wisely and fairly. As a result, there would appear to
be even greater reason to question whether an international body conducting
supervision could be accountable and remain legitimate.
There are three ways to answer these concerns, none of which completely
addresses concerns of accountability and legitimacy, but which may offer some
comfort. First, the international body bears the burden to operate in a
transparent fashion. While. prudential supervision must involve some degree of
confidentiality, the standards of supervision should be openly disclosed and
debated. The caveat to this proposal, however, is that supervision cannot be
conducted "by the book." To avoid the phenomenon where regulated entities
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satisfy the language but not the spirit of the standards requires that supervisors
have some discretion to apply relevant standards.
Second, the international body could broaden its membership to include
representatives from non-governmental entities. Allowing outside groups to
participate in deliberations would make the body more democratic. Here too,
however, there are limits to how much non-governmental groups can participate
in the body's activities. Non-regulators cannot participate in the actual
supervisory process. Therefore, they would be restricted to assisting only in the
development of supervisory standards.
Third, there should be strong political oversight of the international body.
State-to-state contact groups, like the G20, should monitor and review decisions
of the body. Of course, this would not be a significant change from current
practice. The G-groups play a prominent role in directing the agendas of existing
regulatory networks. The concerns with the effectiveness of such oversight are
whether the G-groups have the inclination to provide sufficient oversight, and
alternatively whether too much oversight by the G-groups may end up
threatening the independence of the body.
To the extent possible, efforts should be made to institute procedures and
promote transparency to address concerns of accountability and legitimacy.
Ultimately, however, the legitimacy of an international administrative law body
to oversee supervision of cross-border financial institutions will be determined
by its success in maintaining a sound and safe financial system.
V. CONCLUSION
A new international legal framework is needed to address the absence of
cross-border supervision. Existing regulatory networks showed themselves illequipped to address the causes and effects of the recent financial crisis. The
appropriate regulatory response is to improve the supervision of financial
institutions to avert future crises and respond to any that may arise. This Article
suggests that the international financial architecture needs an administrative law
body that has the resources, independence, and authority to manage the
supervision of cross-border financial institutions. Such a body would be the
natural heir to transgovernmental networks and other legal frameworks
developed to address the intractable problem of regulating the global financial
markets.
An international administrative law body would be a major international
law innovation. Such a model could be applied to a vast array of regulatory
challenges, especially in those areas where supervision of institutions and
markets is vital. More importantly, an administrative law body would become a
new source of international law. While this Article argues that there are many
practical benefits to the creation of such an international administrative law
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regime, questions remain about the accountability and legitimacy of such a
regime that go beyond this Article. This challenge shall be taken up in future
research.
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